Text & Context
Kedoshim - DRAFT
Rabbi Eliezer Shemtov
In this week’s Torah portion, Kedoshim [1], we read the prohibition: “[…] Do not stand idly by while your fellow’s blood is shed…” [2].
Rashi comments: “To see his death while you are able to save him,” and provides examples to illustrate this principle.
This raises some questions: It seems logical that Rashi’s goal is to clarify what “do not stand idly by” means — that one must not remain indifferent in the face of another’s death. But if the verse refers to a situation where one sees someone in danger and has the ability to save them, what is the Torah teaching us by instructing us not to withhold help in such circumstances?
Rashi offers the following example: “For instance, someone drowning in a river and is being attacked by an animal or bandits.”
Questions:
1. Why is it necessary to use an example to explain “someone in danger”? Isn’t the concept self-evident?
2. Why does Rashi use such a specific example?
3. While the example appears in the Talmud and Sifra, Rashi modifies it slightly, sharpening the precision of the example offered:
• In the Talmud and Sifra, three distinct examples are given: 1) someone drowning in a river, 2) someone being attacked by an animal, or 3) someone being attacked by bandits. Rashi combines these into two possible scenarios: someone drowning while simultaneously being attacked by an animal or bandits.
• In contradistinction to the original sources, Rashi does not refer to the animal as being “wild”.
• Rashi follows the Talmud’s order —“animal or bandits”— rather than the order in Sifra, which is “bandits or animal.”
Explanation:
Rashi’s objective is not to explain the literal meaning of the words —i.e., that one must save someone in danger— but rather to address an anomaly in the text. Why does the Torah express the obligation to save a life in a negative form —“Do not stand idly by”— rather than a positive one, such as “You must save your neighbor”? This phrasing indicates that the verse aims to teach us a specific detail about how we are to fulfill this duty.
The detail is derived from the phrase, “Do not stand idly by while your fellow’s blood is shed,” which implies a situation where one might logically reason that it is permissible to remain passive.
What kind of situation would this be?
When saving someone’s life involves risking one’s own life. In such a case, one might think there is no obligation —or that it might even be forbidden— to endanger oneself to save another. This verse clarifies that when another’s life is at risk, one does not have the right to remain passive if one is capable of saving them.
Conversely, if saving the other person would clearly jeopardize the success of the rescue attempt itself, logic dictates that one is not obligated to make the attempt.
This distinction is reflected in Rashi’s comment: Do not remain passive in the face of your fellow’s death —even if it involves risking your own safety— provided you are confident that you can save them. If success is uncertain, you are not obligated to endanger your life to try to save another.
Let's examine the specificity of Rashi’s example:
The Torah prohibits passivity in cases meeting two conditions: 1. The witness faces personal risk; 2. The rescue is certain to succeed.
Rashi has explained elsewhere that the Torah uses practical examples to illustrate an idea. It is reasonable to say that when Rashi cites specific examples, they are rooted in common, real-life situations. Here, Rashi describes a scenario —drowning— in which intervening to save another has a great likelihood of success.
Attacks by bandits or animals usually occur in isolated areas like forests, where it is unclear whether intervention will help or whether it will simply endanger the rescuer. This is why Rashi provides a more common example: “someone drowning in a river.” In this case, someone on solid ground is very likely to be able to save the victim. To illustrate the potential risk to the rescuer, Rashi adds that an animal or bandit might attack. The danger is external to the rescue mission itself, rather than intrinsic to it (e.g., a non-swimmer jumping into the water). The risk lies in whether the animal or bandit will retaliate against the rescuer after the victim is saved.
Rashi also avoids mentioning a “wild animal.” First of all, tame animals are more common near human settlements. Secondly, a wild animal would pose a certain threat to the rescuer, removing any obligation to intervene. In the specific case that Rashi depicts, the animal likely attacks only because the victim, thrashing in the water, appears vulnerable. The presence of a stronger, unharmed human would likely scare it away.
Similarly, the bandit in Rashi’s example follows thye example of the non-wild animal. The bandit is an opportunist targeting a vulnerable person. If a strong rescuer intervenes, it is likely the bandit will flee without posing any real threat.
Lastly, Rashi’s choice of the drowning example reflects an additional consideration: if someone willingly enters a dangerous situation —such as walking alone in a forest where animals or bandits are a known threat— others are not obligated to risk their own safety to save them, even if success is assured.
Intervention is only required when the rescuer faces no personal risk.
Practical Lesson:
The Baal Shem Tov taught that everything a person sees or hears contains a lesson for their life’s mission. G-d does not create anything in vain, not even our encounters with particular situations.
This idea is hinted at in Rashi’s comment: “To see someone’s death while you are able to save them.” The two are interconnected. The very fact that you witness someone in danger means you have the ability to help. If this were not the case, why would Divine Providence cause you to become aware of the situation?
This applies to the spiritual “drowning” of many of our brothers and sisters today. We are forbidden to stand idly by in the face of such a phenomenon. Each of us has the duty and the ability to save them. If someone feels inadequate and asks, “Who am I to make a difference?” the answer from Rashi’s commentary is clear: “If you see their suffering, you are capable of helping them.” The very fact that you are aware of the problem proves that their salvation depends on your efforts to teach them Torah, how to fulfill mitzvot, and to spread Jewish values in general.
Our collective effort will hasten the arrival of Moshiach, the ultimate teacher of Torah.
———————
Leviticus, 19:1-20:27.
ibid. 19:16
Summary of Likutei Sichot, Vol. 32, pp. 120–126.
Comments